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Defendants/Respondents, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
hereby petition the Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to the following points of law 
and points of fact which Petitioners claim the Court has overlooked and/or misapprehended in 
its September 7, 1994 Opinion in this case. 
SECTION I 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHAT 
THE PARTIES MEANT IN THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT 
BY "LEUCADIA (OR ANY OF THE OTHER 
QUALIFIED TEN LISTED COMPANIES)" 
Based upon Appellant's unsupported arguments,1 this Court has concluded (1) that 
the August 22 Agreement is ambiguous on its face as to what the parties meant when they 
referenced "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)," and (2) that there is 
a factual dispute as to what the parties intended by using the phrase "Leucadia (or any of the 
other qualified ten listed companies)" in the August 22 Agreement.2 (September 7, 1994 
1
 Appellant has represented in its Brief on Appeal at p. 26 that: 
...[I]t is undisputed that there is, in fact, no list often companies. Secondly, it 
is also undisputed that no where [sic] on the face of either the August 22 
Agreement or the May 21 letter is there anything tying these two documents 
together. Nor is there anything in Parry's letter to Watkins tying the phrase "list 
often companies" to the May 21 list. Nor, contrary to Defendant's suggestion 
to the District Court, was the May 21, 1988 letter or any other list of ten 
companies ever attached or in any other way incorporated as a part of the August 
22, contract. 
2
 The August 22, 1986 Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit "1" in Appendix I, states in 
its recitals: 
Agreement dated 8-22-86 between Republic Group & Won-Door 
Corporation, through Reed A. Watkins, Re: fee due former if Leucadia (or any 
of the other qualified ten listed companies) acquires an interest in Won-Door. 
[emphasis added]. 
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Opinion, p. 15). Petitioner respectfully submits that the record in this case contradicts these 
conclusions. First of all, the August 22 Agreement was not ambiguous when it referenced 
"Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)." The August 22 Agreement was 
a two-page document. The first page was hand-written. The second page was the May 21st 
letter which specifically listed Leucadia and ten other companies. Appellant's own verified 
pleadings and the sworn testimony of its president prove that the August 22 Agreement was a 
two-page document. And secondly, resort to extrinsic evidence reveals no factual dispute as to 
what the parties intended by "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)." 
A. THE MAY 21. 1986 LETTER LISTING LEUCADIA AND THE OTHER TEN 
QUALIFIED COMPANIES WAS THE SECOND PAGE OF THE AUGUST 22. 
1986 AGREEMENT. AND. AS A RESULT. THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT 
WAS NOT AMBIGIOUS. AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
While Appellant argues that there is no evidence that the August 22 Agreement 
was a two-page document, Appellant's argument ignores undisputed evidence which Appellant 
itself introduced into the record. The August 22 Agreement undisputedly contained two pages, 
the second of which was the May 21 letter. Petitioner respectfully calls the Court's attention 
to the following three evidentiary items: 
1. In paragraph 24 of its Verified Complaint, Appellant states: 
24. Watkins met with plaintiff on or about August 22, 1986, after 
negotiations with TSI had commenced, and at the insistence of defendants 
reduced the Finder Fee Agreement to writing, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated hereby by this reference. 
(R. 000007).3 Exhibit "E" to the Verified Complaint is the August 22 Agreement, a two-page 
document. The first page of the August 22 Agreement is handwritten. The second is the 
3
 Referenced pages from the Verified Complaint are attached hereto in Appendix III. 
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attachment to that agreement, i.e., a copy of the May 21, 1986 letter/ Since Appellant has 
sworn under oath in the very first pleading filed in this case that the May 21, 1986 letter was 
the attachment to the August 22 Agreement, it is incredulous that Appellant has argued in its 
brief on appeal that there is no evidence suggesting that the May 21 letter was ever attached or 
incorporated as a part of the August 22 Agreement, (p. 26, Appellant's Brief on Appeal). 
2. Mr. Irvin D. Bird, Jr., president of the Appellant corporation, verified the 
Complaint under oath. Confirming his sworn statements in that document, Mr. Bird testified 
in his deposition that the May 21, 1986 letter was attached to and a part of the August 22 
Agreement. At page 79 of his deposition, Mr. Bird identified the August 22 Agreement and its 
attached May 21, 1986 letter as Exhibit "6" to the deposition.5 Clearly Mr. Bird understood 
that the May 21, 1986 letter was an attachment to the August 22 Agreement. 
3. In responding to questions regarding Exhibit "6" to his deposition, i.e., 
the August 22 Agreement, Mr. Bird specifically testified that the language "Leucadia (or any 
of the other qualified ten companies)" to which the August 22 Agreement made reference was 
the list set out in the second page of the agreement itself: 
Q: Now, [the August 22 Agreement] goes on to state, "Re: fee due 
former-" and that's The Republic Group; that's as you understand it, 
right? 
A: Yes, 
Q: [quoting the August 22 Agreement] "If Leucadia (or any of the 
other qualified ten companies) acquires an interest in Won-Door," right? 
4
 Exhibit "E" to the Verified Complaint is located in the record at R. 000021-000022. 
Petitioners have attached that document hereto as Exhibit "1" in Appendix I. 
5
 Referenced pages of Mr. Bird's deposition are attached hereto in Appendix II. 
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A: That's correct. 
Q: Okay, and Leucadia and the other qualified ten listed 
companies are those ones listed on the second page [the May 21, 1986 
letter] right? 
A: They are. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 81. This undisputed testimony unqualifiedly 
identifies the "other qualified ten listed companies" (besides Leucadia) to which the August 22 
Agreement made reference.6 
Thus, Petitioners respectfully submit that while Appellant argues that there is no 
evidence tying together the August 22 Agreement with the May 21, 1986 letter, Appellant is 
plainly wrong, based upon the undisputed sworn statements and testimony of its own president. 
The August 22 Agreement with its attachment is not ambiguous, and as a matter of law should 
be enforced according to its terms. (See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pps. 26-31, 33-41) 
B. EVEN IF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WERE NECESSARY, THE UNDISPUTED 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT AND ITS VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT SHOW THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT AS TO WHAT THE PARTIES INTENDED BY THE PHRASE 
"LEUCADIA (OR ANY OF THE OTHER QUALIFIED TEN LISTED 
COMPANIES)". 
If resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions is necessary, Appellant's 
sworn statements in both its Verified Complaint and in the deposition of its president 
6
 It must be remembered that the phrase "Leucadia or any of the other qualified ten listed 
companies" was first drafted by Appellant's attorney in his August 20, 1994 letter to Reed 
Watkins, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" in Appendix I. In that letter, 
Appellant was requesting that a fee agreement be entered into with respect to Leucadia and the 
other qualified ten listed companies. For Appellant, whose attorney coined the language, to now 
say that it doesn't know what that language references is belied by Appellant's Verified 
Complaint, the testimony of its own president, and common sense. 
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undisputedly indicate that the parties intended the phrase, "Leucadia (or any of the other 
qualified ten listed companies)" to refer to the May 21, 1986 letter. Mr. Bird's deposition 
testimony cited above is crystal clear. 
In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary. Appellant cannot 
and has not pointed to any list of "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed companies)" 
other than the May 21st letter to which the parties could possibly have been making reference. 
The only other list that was ever circulated between the parties was the May 27 list, and that 
one contained 15 names and included Thermal Systems, Inc. But Appellant has acknowledged 
that in signing the August 22 Agreement, it excluded Thermal Systems, Inc. from the list of 
qualified companies: 
27. On August 22, 1986, plaintiff was unaware that its introduction of 
Won-Door Corporation to [Thermal Systems, Inc.J7 had resulted in negotiations, 
and in reliance upon the representations of Watkins and in ignorance of the true 
situation relating to [Thermal Systems, Inc.], executed the second Fee Agreement 
excluding [Thermal Systems. Inc. 1 from the list of qualified companies upon which 
it would be entitled to a finders fee in the event of a successful sale, [emphasis 
added]. 
Appellant's Verified Complaint, par. 27 (R. 00008). Thus, the May 27th list could not possibly 
have been the list to which the parties made reference by their use of the phrase "Leucadia (or 
any of the other qualified ten listed companies)".8 That list contained Thermal Systems, Inc. 
and had fifteen, not ten additional names. Nor does the May 27th list include Leucadia. The 
7
 In paragraph 15 of the Verified Complaint at R. 000005, Appellant defined Thermal 
Systems, Inc. as "TSI". 
8
 Quite frankly, if the only issue in this case were what constituted the "list of ten" to which 
the August 22 Agreement made reference, Appellant's admission that TSI was not on that list 
is determinative of whether Appellant was entitled to a finders fee for locating TSI. 
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extrinsic evidence undisputedly proves that the only list to which the August 22 Agreement could 
have been making reference is the one included in the May 21st letter. 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD CONFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT 
THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT. AS A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT. CONTROLLED THEIR 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP. 
Apparently the Court relied on Appellant's erroneous and inaccurate statements 
regarding the record when it ruled that the August 22 Agreement was ambigious and that there 
was disputed evidence regarding the phrase "Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten listed 
companies)."9 But the record speaks for itself. The sworn admissions of Appellant in its 
Verified Complaint, the exhibits thereto, and the deposition testimony of Appellant's president 
are conclusive on this issue. As a matter of law, there is no genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to what the parties intended. The trial court's ruling that the August 22 Agreement was 
the contract controlling the parties' relationship should be affirmed. 
SECTION II 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER 
THERE WAS A FEE AGREEMENT IN PLACE 
AT THE TIME OF PETITIONERS' ALLEGED BREACH 
OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The Court has raised the issue as to whether there was a fee agreement in place 
prior to August 22, either by modification of the March 12 agreement or by the parties having 
entered into a new contract. Petitioners submit that the undisputed evidence is that no fee 
9
 The Court also relied on Appellant's false statements in its brief, unsupported by citation 
to the record, that the May 21, 1986 letter was never given to Boettcher. Appellant's Brief, p. 
9. In fact, Reed Watkins's December 28, 1990 Affidavit states that the letter was given to 
Boettcher. That testimony is undisputed. (R. 000300. Mr. Watkins's Affidavit is contained 
in Appendix IV hereto). 
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agreement was in place, and that the Appellant's allegations that there was a contract for a 
"reasonable fee" fail as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear in 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988), that courts cannot engage in 
determining what is or is not "reasonable rent" because courts simply are not equipped to make 
such decisions and should not "impose paternalistic agreements on litigants." Id. at 502. 
A key element of this Court's decision is its holding that a reasonable fee could 
be determined and inferred from the factual circumstances, rejecting Petitioners' analysis of 
Pingree v.Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 588 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).10 However, in the 
Cottonwood Mall case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Pingree broadly, making 
it clear that courts are not to determine what constitutes a reasonable rent. In Cottonwood Mall, 
the defendant had purchased the outstanding stock of a bowling alley after multiple oral 
assurances from the landlord of the bowling alley that it would be willing to renew the lease at 
a "reasonable rent." After he purchased the bowling alley, the defendant expended $10,000 to 
$20,000 improving and remodeling the leased space based upon additional representations from 
the landlord that he would "renew the lease on reasonable terms at or about the time the present 
lease would expire." Id. at 500. After lengthy negotiations, the landlord ultimately refused to 
renew the lease and brought an eviction action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the landlord's repeated promises and the parties' 
agreement that a "reasonable rent" would be charged upon renewal were too indefinite to 
enforce. 
Court's September 7, 1994 Opinion, pp. 8-9. 
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Defendant argues that in Pmgree, the court declined to fix the renewal rent 
because of the difficulty in balancing the several factors which the lease required 
the parties to consider in fixing the rent. Here, defendant's argument continues, 
no factors are listed in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do not 
agree, [emphasis added]. 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d at 502. The Supreme Court went on to explain why 
courts should not make an agreement for the parties based upon some standard or factor of 
reasonableness: 
In determining what is "reasonable rent," many factors must be weighed and put 
into the equation. Business judgments must be made. Horman testified that he 
would not negotiate a new lease at the time Sine's real estate agents approached 
him because of inflation and instability in the commercial leasing market. He 
was unwilling to enter into another lease, either long term or short term, unless 
he could consider the costs of operating and owing the building as they compared 
to the amount of rent received. He only indicated that he would be willing to 
enter into a new lease at a reasonable figure and at the appropriate time. Courts 
simply are not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating 
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose paternalistic agreements 
on litigants, [emphasis added] 
Id. at 502. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded, the trial court acted properly in not 
writing the contract by telling what the parties what the reasonable rent would be. 
In determining whether the parties in this case entered into any enforceable 
modification, the undisputed record is determinative. Appellant has undisputedly acknowledged 
that by May 1986 it was not operating under the March 12 Agreement. The testimony of all of 
the parties is clear that the March 12 Agreement covered the parties relationship for only 22% 
of the stock, not for 100%. Appellant's president even testified that the document became 
obsolete when Won-Door began looking for a 100% buyer: 
A. . . . In fact, this document became very obsolete. This was a 
document where we defined a 22 percent investor in Won-Door which we were to 
be paid $250,000. This document became obsolete when it was determined that 
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Won-Door would entertain a sale for the entire corporation, and at that point we 
no longer worked on this document. . . . 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 19. Mr. Bird reaffirmed that testimony later in his 
deposition: 
Q. You said you brought someone in April or May to Mr. Watkins that 
would perform the formula or buy that smaller percentage of Won-Door. Who 
was that? 
A. Mr. James Volker, and that was well after we were into merger 
discussions with others. I called Reed and specifically asked him. I said, Reed, 
I know we 're not working under this deal any more. I know— 
Q. By that you mean [the March 12 Agreement]? 
A. Selling 22 percent as defined in [the March 12 Agreement], that we 
were not looking for a full merger partner. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 21. Mr. Bird went on to acknowledge that while the 
discussions with Mr. Volker were covered by the March 12 Agreement, that was the only 
activity under the March 12 Agreement that occurred after a decision was made to sell 100% 
of the corporation. Id. at p. 22. 
It is undisputed that by May 1986, Appellant had determined that it could not 
obtain an investor for only 22 percent of the stock, as was required by the March 12 Agreement: 
Q. So Republic Group started at the latter part of February '86 and then 
well into May before the Republic Group determined that it couldn't get an 
investor for the 22 percent? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 16. 
The fact that Appellant could not perform under the terms of the March 12 
Agreement was communicated to Petitioners starting in at least April: 
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A. . . . Our activity mainly changed from this emphasis [the March 12 
Agreement] very shortly after this to finding a full merger partner. 
Q. Would that have been in May when that happened? 
A. That would have been in April, starting in April Reed and I had a 
number of meetings during this period of January, February, March and April 
relating to this almost on a daily basis, as a matter of fact, and I made it known 
to him that it was our opinion hat The Republic Group, that an investment of this 
kind in a private corporation was just an impossible thins to do. [emphasis 
added]. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at pp. 17-18. Mr. Bird explained Appellant's inability to 
perform as follows: 
A. . . . I think we have to clarify the fact that we determined at The 
Republic Group in our discussions in-house that a $7 million private placement 
in a private corporation in a minority interest could not be accomplished. 
Unfortunately, I can't remember the names of several people that we talked to 
Reed about that, but at that time we talked to them we told them that in our 
opinion a minority interest in a privately owned corporation we could not fund, 
[emphasis added]. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 15. 
Undisputedly, by May 1986, Appellant could not perform its obligations under 
the March 12 Agreement. Thus, the only contract in August 1986 of which Appellants could 
possibly complain was either a new contract or a modification of the March 12 Agreement. The 
Court acknowledges this argument on p. 5 of its opinion where it states, 
If the trial court could determine as a matter of law on the undisputed facts that 
the parties had, orally or by conduct, rescinded or otherwise terminated the 
March 12 agreement without entering into a new agreement, then no contract was 
in place and no covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed at the time of the 
alleged breach. If, on the other hand, the facts could support a finding that the 
parties either modified the March 12 agreement or terminated the March 12 
agreement and entered into a new one, then a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing may have been in effect. 
Court of Appeals' 9/7/94 Opinion at p. 5. 
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While parties to contract may modify, waive or make new contractual terms, the 
minds of the parties must have met upon any asserted contract modification. Provo City Corp. 
v. Nielson Scott Co., 604 P.2d. 803, 806 (Utah 1979). If the modification is too vague and 
indefinite, it will not be enforcable. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 
1988). The evidence in this case is clear that there was no contract between the parties prior 
to August 22. 
Prior to August 22, any alleged contract between the parties was too indefinite 
to be enforced. The parties did not agree upon which contacts would result in a fee being paid. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8). The parties did not decide on a fee. Id. Prior to August 22, 
according to Appellant, it was extremely upset that there was no fee agreement: 
So at a meeting on the 20th of August my partners Bryant Gragun—my 
associates, not partners-my associates, Mark McSwain, Fred Volcansec, all 
drafted letters to be written. And I thought they were all too harsh, so I asked 
Mr. Doug Parry to write a letter saying that we knew that tomorrow or the next 
day there was going to be an offer made for cash and we had no fee agreement; 
and we demanded, absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure 
that the offer wasn't forthcoming, and we'd had that discussion with Leucadia. 
And so this letter was written in an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive 
agreement together listing all of the companies that we had brought, [emphasis 
added]. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 8/10/88 Deposition at p. 65. 
The case before this Court is directly analogous to Cottonwood Mall. As in that case, 
according to Appellant in this case, there was an agreement for a "reasonable fee."11 Prior to 
August 22, the parties had not decided on what constituted a reasonable fee. Nor, according to 
11
 Paragraph 28 of Appellant's Verified Complaint alleges only that the agreement between 
the parties provided that Appellant "would be paid a reasonable fee upon the closing of the TSI 
transaction." (R. 000008). 
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Appellant, had the parties agreed upon which contacts would result in a fee being paid. Thus, 
prior to August 22, the alleged "contract" was far too indefinite to enforce.12 Frankly, while 
Petitioners disagree with the Court's assessment that there are issues of fact remaining as to 
Appellant's fraud claim, that remedy is the only one available to Appellants. While Appellants 
could recover (if the facts supported the claim) for being defrauded into signing the August 22 
Agreement, they cannot ask the Court to enforce the negotiations that led up to the August 22 
Agreement. Until that document was signed, as a matter of law there was no agreement between 
the parties sufficiently definite to have been enforced. 
As a matter of law as enunciated in Cottonwood Mali, there was no meeting of 
minds with respect to a modification of the March 12 Agreement or any new contract until 
August 22. The lack of agreement regarding (a) the fee arrangement, and (b) which companies 
were covered by the agreement prevents enforcement of an indefinitely vague contract. 
Therefore, there could be no breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners believe that the Court's September 7, 1994 Opinion in this case has 
overlooked and/or misapprehended the points of law and points of facts set forth in this Petition. 
Therefore, Petitioners request the Court to review the record and the Supreme Court's opinion 
12
 Petitioners note that if the law were other than that set out in Cottonwood Mall, courts 
would end up in the business of making contracts for parties. For example, litigants could ask 
for a determination of the price of a BMW that a car dealer had agreed to sell at a "reasonable 
price" and for which a purchaser had agreed to pay a "reasonable price." Based upon a contract 
in which the parties, after lengthy negotiation, had agreed upon the color, make, year and model 
of the vehicle, one party to the contract could ask the court to determine the "reasonable price" 
and then enforce the contract. Cottonwood Mall makes it clear that courts should decline such 
invitations to make or enforce an agreement when the parties themselves have failed. 
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in Cottonwood Mall and reconsider its decision in this regard. Petitioners request the Court to 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing claims. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of September, 1994. 
By their signatures below, counsel for Respondents hereby certify that this petition for 
rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Jay & Ron Smart 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
ghwo^^ 
Jdlffre/ W. Jones 
Paul M. Durham 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Won-Door Corp. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 3>6 day of September, 1994, to each of the following: 
Richard K* Crandall, Esq. 
925 East Executive Park, Suite D 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Robert G. Norton, Esq. 
7105 So. Highland Drive, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
(lvf\wondor.pet) 
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May 21 f 1986 
Reed A. Watkins 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4109 
Dear Reed, 
This letter serves as fonral nocice to you of our list of prospective 
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation, 
1. Wcs Kay Corp. 
2. Capital Consultants Inc. 
3. The Republic Croup 
4. The Dallas Corp. 
5. Leucadia Inc. 
6. VJeyerr.r..?u3er Cere. 
7. I-laccc 
8. Pcachrrcc Deer, A Division of Indal Corp, 
9. Annsrrong World Corp. 
10. Teledyne Corp. 
11. Dcstinick & bonir^1-
are v.crking d i l i g e n t l y to e f fec t the s a l e of your c l i e n t ' s canpany. 
Personal Regards, 
Vice Fresid=r.t 
The Rcrjublic Crcuo 
I rv in D. Eird J r . 
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 s o SOUTH MAIM STWCCT 
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• LAKC S. ATKIN 
THOMAS A, MtTCMCLL 
August 20, 1986 
Reed A. Watkins, Esq. 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
RE: The Republic Group/Won-Door 
Dear Mr. Watkins: 
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone 
conversation of last week and your assurance that you 
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or 
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an 
interest in Won-Door. 
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv 
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that: 
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia, 
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group 
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based 
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased, 
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the 
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should 
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee. 
If that does not comport with your understanding I would 
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this 
matter with my client. 
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating 
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining 
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The 
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees. 
* DEPOSITION 
| EXHIBIT 
J t>:^ 
Reed A. Watkins, Esq. 
Page 2 
August 20, 1986 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will 
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the 
agreement. 
DJP:cc 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. C88-3902 
vs. ) 
) Deposition of: 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, REED A. WATKINS,) IRVIN D. BIRD, JR. 
JAY A. SMART, RON SMART, and ) 
DOES 1 through 20, ) VOLUME I 
Defendants. ) 
Deposition of IRVIN D. BIRD, JR., taken at the 
instance and request of the Defendants, at the law offices 
of Walter P. Faber, Jr., 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on Wednesday, the 10th day of August, 1988, at 
the hour of 10:10 a.m., before VICKY MCDANIEL, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, Utah License No. 285. 
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15 
under that paragraph, under this effort for the seven 
million, 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
clarify 
but there were some of them— 
Did you ever make a written list— 
No. 
— o f those names? 
No, not under this segment. I think we have to 
the fact that we determined at The Republic Group in 
our discussions in-house that a $7 million private placement 
in a private corporation in a minority interest could not be 
accompli 
several 
time we 
minority 
not fund 
Q 
Group's? 
A 
got—we' 
shed. Unfortunately, I can't remember the names of 
people that we 
talked to them 
r
 interest in a 
1. 
Okay. Now, 
talked to Reed about that, but at the 
we told them that in our opinion a 
privately owned corporation we could 
your opinion, that is, The Republic 
Republic Group's opinion, yeah. Now, we have 
d have to talk 
great number of people 
Q 
people? 
to Mr. Watkins. We talked to not a 
under this arrangement. 
Over what period of time did you talk to those 
{Witness consults 
contact 
MR. WILKINS: 
THE WITNESS: 
was around the 
with counsel off the record.) 
Did you hear the question? 
Yes. During the period—our first 
last part of February and coming into 
16 
1 March of 1986. 
2 Q (By Mr. Faber) And that would be prior to the 
3 March 12th, '86 letter? 
4 A That would be up to—I'd say well into April, 
5 maybe into May that we determined that we couldn't really 
6 exclusively get a private investment there—investor. 
7 Q So Republic Group started at the latter part of 
8 February '86 and then well up into May before The Republic 
9 Group determined that it couldn't get an investor for the 2 
10 percent? 
11 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
12 Q Now, during that period did The Republic Group— 
13 can you recall any names that you talked to Mr. Watkins 
14 about in reference to Exhibit 1? 
15 A There are a number of names. I think we talked 
16 to him about Richard Peery in Palo Alto, private investor. 
17 He's a large investor. 
18 Q Was he a sole proprietorship or a corporation? 
19 A He's a sole proprietorship. He's a real estate 
20 developer. 
21 Q Richard Peery? 
22 A Yeah. 
23 Q How do you spell,Peery? 
24 A P-e-e-r-y. 
25 Q Two double e's and r-y? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Uh-huh, e-e-r-y. 
In Palo Alto? 
Yes. 
Do you have his address? 
No, but I could supply it to you. 
All right. Who else? 
17 
I'd have to talk with Reed and get those names. 
We talked to a number of people that we talked 1 
those specifically, but I can't recall exactly \ 
were. I 
to Reed about 
rfhat they 
could meet with my other associates; they kept [ 
better notes than I did, and they would have to 
to you. 
Q 
I don't know that at this moment. 
But your associates would have notes 
the documents you've furnished us today? 
A 
Q 
They might have. I don't know. 
Did you inquire of them whether they 
documents so that you might bring them today? 
A 
activity 
after thi 
Q 
A 
Reed and 
January, 
supply that 
other than 
had such 
No. I brought all the documents we had. Our 
mainly changed from this emphasis very 
s to finding a full merger partner. 
shortly 
Would that have been in May when that happened? 
That would have been in April, starting in April. 
I had a number of meetings during this period of 
February, March, April relating to this almost on a 
daily basis, as a matter of fact, and I made it known to him 
18 
that it was our opinion that The Republic Group, that an 
investment 
impo. 
time 
Marc] 
meet 
went 
that 
di-dn 
hard 
time 
your 
the < 
you ] 
ssible 
Q 
? 
A 
ti 6th, 
ing I 
over 
time . 
Q 
• t < 
A 
Q 
to 
A 
• 
Q 
of this kind in a private corporation was just an 
thing to do. 
When do you recall telling him that for 
It would have been even during the time, 
I have a note that you have a photocopy 
held on March 6th at my office with Reed 
the first 
maybe— 
of of a 
where we 
the financials. I suspect we discussed it about 
So you told him prior to Exhibit 1 
think that the— 
do 
I said it looked difficult at this 
—the proposed sale of 22 percent i 
? 
that 
time. 
would 
Yeah, looked like a difficult situation 
Now, you're looking at some notes. 
private notes there? 
A They're just a list of some of the 
discussions that were held. 
Q 
A 
Q 
put on 
When did you compile those notes? 
Last night. 
What did you look at to determine 1 
those notes? 
Are 
you 
be very 
at that 
those 
meetings and 
the dates that 
19 
A Well, I went through this sheath of papers that 
you have, and it says a note of a meeting the 6th of March 
with Reed Watkins, discussed financials, put that down. At 
8:30 the morning of March 6th I had a meeting with Watkins, 
see the list of the company strengths—he listed for us that 
day the company strengths, why Won-Door would be a good 
merger partner or a good candidate for someone to make an 
investment. 
Q You have no objection to our making a copy of 
your notes? 
A None whatever- They're just very sketchy. 
Q Now, Mr. Bird, calling your attention again to 
the last sentence of Exhibit 1, there is a portion of the 
sentence there that says, "to avoid misunderstanding 
regarding contacts." Was there discussion with Mr. Watkins 
as to avoiding misunderstanding? 
A Not particularly. In fact, this document became 
very obsolete. This was a document where we defined a 22 
percent investor in Won-Door for which we were to be paid 
$250,000. This document became obsolete when it was 
determined that Won-Door would entertain a sale for the 
entire corporation, and at that point we no longer worked on 
this document except that we figured that if we raised $7 
million for $250,000, if we sold the company for $30 million 
it ought to be maybe five times that. 
21 
in in May who might have been able to perform this. Prior 
to that we were working in April. We went through an 
exercise, The Republic Group, and it was determined for Mr. 
Watkins that the whole corporation would be sold. We did an 
exercise where we examined every company on the Standard and 
Poors to locate a purchaser or a merger partner for 
Won-Door. 
Q You said you brought someone in April or May to 
Mr. Watkins that would perform the formula or buy that 
smaller percentage of Won-Door. Who was that? 
A Mr. James Volker, and that was well after we were 
into merger discussions with others- I call-ed Reed and 
specifically asked him. I said, Reed, I know we're not 
working under this deal any more. I know— 
Q By that you mean Exhibit 1? 
A Selling 22 percent as defined in Exhibit 1, that 
we were now looking for a full merger partner. 
Q When did you talk to Mr. Watkins about that? 
A I'm not—exact date, I can find that for you. 
Mr. Watkins came to The Republic Group and met with us when 
Mr. Volker came to town after I had asked Feed's permission 
to have him come. I said, Are you still interested in a 22 
percent arrangement? We know we're working on the sale of 
the whole company and I know we have certain arrangements 
with Boettchers—you do, and you have certain names for us; 
22 
do you or 
town? Mr. 
do you not want me to have Mr. Volker come to 
Watkins said, I do want him to come to town. 
He came to town and we discussed an arrangement 
under Exhibit 1 with Mr. Volker. It's the only activity we 
had under Exhibit 1 after it was determined the whole 
corporation was going to be sold. 
Q 
was going 
A 
because I 
When was it determined that the whole corporation 
to be sold? 
I suspect we started working on it in April 
have certain notes where we met with Leucadia 
Corporation in March and April, May, and others. It's at 
that period that we started our solicitation and talked with 
Reed about companies we were going to make contact with on 
the American and the New York Stock Exchange. 
Q 
with? 
A 
Who were those companies that you made contact 
We have a list of those in our complaint, Exhibit 
B or whatever it is. I guess the better way to answer your 
question is, I submitted to you a list of Standard and Poors 
companies; • we highlighted certain ones that in our opinion 
would be interested in the purchase of Won-Door, and we 
discussed those on a daily basis with Mr. Watkins, who we 
were seeing. 
Q 
a portion 
Was that purchase of the entire Won-Door or only 
of the— 
65 
he's say nothing, and I'd say, I called Leucadia; they said 
that the following things happened: we discussed this, this, 
this, and this. Then I was damn sure I was out of the loop. 
So at a meeting on the 20th of August my partners 
Bryant Cragun—my associates, not partners—my associates, 
Mark McSwain, Fred Volcansek, all drafted letters to be 
written. And T thought they were all too harsh, so I asked 
Mr. Doug Parry to write a letter saying that we knew that 
tomorrow or the next day there was going to be an offer made 
for cash and we had no fee agreement; and we demanded, 
absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure 
that the offer wasn't forthcoming, and we'd had that 
discussion with Leucadia. And so this letter was written in 
an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive agreement 
together listing all of the companies that we had brought. 
Q Now, you mentioned that this was the second 
letter that you'd asked Mr. Parry to write. Did he in fact 
write a prior letter? 
A He did. I don't have a copy of it, but it's my 
understanding that he did write a letter. I know that Reed 
called him and had some discussions after. 
Q I haven't seen such a letter, Mr. Bird, so if you 
find it will you supply us a copy of that? 
A Yes, I will. 
Q All right. But the prior letter that you were 
79 
A I don't know. I didn't write the letter. That 
wouldn't have been my wording. 
Q Okay. But in any case, had you looked at this 
letter at the time Mr. Parry sent it you would have changed 
it? 
A Uh-huh. I probably would have said the fee 
should be five million. No. 
Q But you would have changed it? 
A I would have changed it, yes. I would have made 
it more inclusive. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit 6 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (By Mr. Faber) Now, Mr. Bird, I show you what's 
been marked as Exhibit 6 to this deposition, which appears 
to be a handwritten agreement dated August 22nd, '86; and 
attached to it is a copy of the letter of May 21st.. '86 to 
Mr. Watkins. Can you identify this document-? 
A Yes, I've seen the document. 
Q When did you first see it? 
A I was present when Mr. Watkins wrote it. 
Q On August 22nd, 19«6? 
A Uh-huh, at the office of The Republic Group at 
185 South State. 
Q Okay. Now, I note that this agreement is dated 
two days after Exhibit 5, which is Mr. Parry's letter to Mr. 
81 
Inc. 
A 
Q 
mentioned 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
former-f<mm M 
understand 
A 
Q 
listed 
A 
Q 
listed 
right? 
A 
Q 
formula 
That's correct. 
Okay, And that would be the same Leucadia that's 
in Mr. Parry's letter, Exhibit 5? 
Uh-huh-
Would you answer— 
Yes. I'm sorry. 
Now, this document goes on to state, "Re fee due 
*nd that's The Republic Group; that's as you 
it, right? 
Yes. 
"If Leucadia (or any of the other qualified ten 
companies) aquires an interest in Won-Door," right? 
That's correct. 
Okay, and Leucadia and the other qualified ten 
companies are those ones listed on the second page, 
They are. 
Now, then there is a listing A, B, C, D, E of the 
L for a fee on the first page of Exhibit 6, and as I 
understand 
formula 
A 
Q 
office 
1/ C 
and 
your prior testimony, that would be the Lehman 
orrect? 
That's correct. 
So on August 22nd, '86 Reed storms into your 
he writes out- the first page of Exhibit 6? 
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Michael J. Wilkins (Bar No. 3470) 
TIBBALS, HOWELL & MOXLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Two Fifty Seven Towers, Suite 850 
257 East 200 South-2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048 
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^ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^J> STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
REED A. WATKINS, 
JAY A. SMART, RON SMART, and 
DOES 1 THROUGH 20, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
ivil No. C  
Judge 
Plaintiff complains of the defendants and alleges as 
follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the acts complained of herein 
all occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
0 P n r* r o 
include authorization for plaintiff to present to its contacts the 
invitation to buy Won-Door Corporation at a sale price of $32-$35 
million, and further agreed to pay plaintiff a reasonable fee in 
the event one of its contacts actually closed such a purchase of 
Won-Door Corporation. 
12. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff requested defen-
dant Watkins reduce the modified fee arrangement to writing, which 
defendant Watkins initially refused to do, telling Bird that he did 
not need a contract in writing inasmuch as they were old friends, 
and Watkins would see that plaintiff was fully compensated. 
13. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff set about to 
market Won-Door Corporation by the presentation of a written 
marketing brochure and the preparation of a descriptive video tape 
which it proceeded to introduce to more than 2 0 prospective buyers 
believed to be financially able to make the acquisition. 
14. During the period of marketing, defendant Watkins 
was in daily contact with plaintiff, encouraging the marketing 
efforts, and seeking information about potential buyers. 
15. By mid-May, 1986, plaintiff had caused Won-Door 
Corporation's sales proposition to be presented to 2 0 to 30 
companies, including Thermal Systems, Inc. ("TSI") and Leucadia 
National Corporation ("Leucadia"). 
4 
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for $35,000,000 cash, which offer was ultimately rejected by Won-
Door Corporation. 
22. Leucadia was ready, willing and able to close the 
sale for $35,000,000 cash at the time it was rejected by defen-
dants . 
23. During the summer months of 1986, having received 
the Won-Door Corporation proposal and information from plaintiff, 
agents of TSI contacted defendant Watkins directly and commenced 
negotiations for the acquisition of Won-Door Corporation. 
24. Watkins met with plaintiff on or about August 22, 
1986, after negotiations with TSI had commenced, and at the 
insistence of defendants reduced the Finder Fee Agreement to 
writing, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
25. At the time the Agreement dated August 22, 1986 was 
drafted by Watkins, Watkins knew that he was engaged in serious 
merger negotiations with TSI and that TSI had been introduced to 
Won-Door Corporation through the efforts of plaintiff. 
26. At the time of drafting the Agreement of August 22, 
1986, Watkins did not disclose to plaintiff that negotiations with 
TSI had commenced, and in fact refused to discuss TSI, suggesting 
they be removed from the list of potential buyers as an unfruitful 
prospect. 
6 
000 
27. On August 22, 1986, plaintiff was unaware that its 
introduction of Won-Door Corporation to TSI had resulted in 
negotiations, and in reliance upon the representations of Watkins 
and in ignorance of the true situation relating to TSI, executed 
the second Fee Agreement excluding TSI from the list of qualified 
companies upon which it would be entitled to a finders fee in the 
event of a successful sale. 
28. Thereafter, on October 27, 1986, plaintiff became 
aware for the first time that a merger between TSI and Won-Door 
Corporation had been agreed to, when it was announced to the 
public. 
29. On October 27, 1986, Bird contacted defendant 
Watkins to congratulate him on the conclusion of a merger transac-
tion, and to request the agreed fee. 
30. Defendant Watkins refused and continues to refuse, 
for himself and on behalf of the other defendants, to pay the fee 
agreed between the parties for the TSI/Won-Door Corporation 
transaction. 
31. As his own fee for the transaction, defendant 
Watkins personally received the value of approximately $2,627,000. 
32. Defendants Smart and Doe received $15,000,000 cash, 
plus 1.5 million shares of TSI stock, which was valued at the date 
7 
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WALTER P. FABER, JR. (A1026) 
Attorney for Defendant Watkins 
2102 East 3300 South 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE " 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC., ] 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, 
VSo ] 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, REED A. WATKINS, 
JAY Ao SMART, RON SMART, and ] 
DOES 1 THROUGH 20, 
Defendants. 
' AFFIDAVIT OF REED A. WATKINS 
* IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFfS 
) MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
> SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. C88-3902 
) JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
REED A. WATKINS, being first duly sworn of his own 
knowledge, states as follows: 
1. Affidavit is over the age of twenty-one and is a 
residence of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Early in 1986, I was authorized as an agent of Won-Door 
and its shareholders to find funding through an initial public 
offering or a private placement of stock. Pursuant to this 
authority I contacted several companies and individuals who might 
assist in finding a buyer. 
3. Among those contacted was Irvin D. Bird, Jr. ("Bird"), 
president of The Republic Group ("Republic"), who, after 
reviewing and discussing the promotional materials I gave him, 
^ ^ <-' ^  u i 
(c) Other than the exceptions, the contract with Boettcher 
was exclusive. We discussed that if a sale were made to one of 
Republic's exceptions, a Lehman formula commission would be paid 
to Republic and no commission would be paid Boettcher. On the 
other hand, upon a sale of Won-Door to anyone else, Boettcher 
would be entitled to a commission and no commission would be 
payable to Republic. 
13. Thereafter on May 21, 1986, I received Republic's list 
of exceptions and gave a copy to Boettcher. 
14. Republic's May 21, 1986 list actually contained eleven 
names instead of ten. However, Boettcher agreed that the 
companies on that list would be excepted from the Boettcher 
agreement. 
15. Boettcher had also requested that Republic provide a 
list of any other prospective buyers for Won-Door to whom Bird or 
Republic had sent promotional materials concerning Won-Door. I 
explained that Boettcher did not want to send information and 
promotional materials to any company which had previously 
received material on Won-Door from Republic. 
16. Pursuant to this request, Bird then gave me the 
handwritten list of May 27, 1986, a copy of which I gave to 
Boettcher. 
17. Mr. Bird's May 27, 1986 list contained the name 
"Thermal Systems, Inc." Won-Door was sold to TS Industries, Inc. 
in October, 1986. Thermal Systems, Inc. is a subsidiary of TS 
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